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The core of a policy for accelerating economic growth is a
combination of knowledge accumulation and diversification of the
productive structure. These two dimensions are the focus of the present
article, which examines industrial policy experiences during the import
substitution industrialization period; highlights the policies currently being
applied in Latin America and the Caribbean and offers a typology of the
strategies underlying them; presents the main lines of action and policy
instruments; and analyses issues of policy implementation and impact.
The thesis is that, while policymaking capabilities have improved, a great
deal of work is still needed on implementation and on the development of
effective impact evaluation methodologies. Proper evaluation will show
whether industrial policies have a role to play in the region.
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I
Introduction
This study sets out from the hypothesis that policies to
create new production sectors or modernize mature ones
are needed in Latin America and the Caribbean in order
to boost development, subject to the constraints
represented by the size, existing development level and
productive structure of the different national
economies.1  By improving the product mix and the
vector of international specialization, diversification of
the productive structure has a vital role to play in closing
the productivity gap between these countries and those
at the international technology frontier and thus in
accelerating overall productivity growth in open
economies. Such diversification results in better
domestic linkages, strengthening the positive impact
of economic growth on overall productivity (Cimoli,
Correa and Primi, 2003).
Policies to strengthen individual sectors can
increase the density and complexity of a national
productive structure, and these in turn are positively
correlated with the stability of a country’s growth rates
and the speed and flexibility with which it responds to
external shocks (Castaldi, 2003). The effect of
productive complexity is to create internal
counterweights to the transmission of shocks, thus
generating automatic stabilizers. Specialization with a
higher knowledge content and diversification are both
important to allow full advantage to be taken of the
growing returns to scale implicit in technical progress,
leading directly to virtuous cycles of cumulative
causality (Young, 1928; Stigler, 1951; Kaldor, 1966).
In summary, the key to any policy for accelerating
productivity growth in the long term has to be a
combination of knowledge accumulation and
diversification of the productive structure. The first
creates the opportunities; the second means that they
can be capitalized upon. Both dimensions are dealt with
in this study, which is organized into five sections.
Following this introductory section, which reviews the
broad outlines of industrial policy developments during
the import substitution industrialization period, section
II examines current policy practices in the region and
offers a typology of the strategies underlying them.
Section III presents the main lines of action and policy
instruments, while section IV analyses policy
implementation and impact evaluation issues. Section
V, lastly, presents some conclusions.
Policies to create new sectors were the centrepiece
of industrial policy in the import substitution model;2
they are generally defined now as policies that seek to
alter the goods and services production vector (Chang,
1994; Melo, 2001), which necessarily entails the
creation of new activities. The goal of these policies
was to take advantage of growth in domestic demand,
investment demand in particular, to complete the
industrial fabric of the countries, considering that this
growth would otherwise have translated into rising
imports, with all the external constraints these imply.
During the 1970s, there was a growing perception that
the effects of investment fell into two parts: on the one
hand, the installation of productive capacity, with
positive effects on aggregate supply; on the other, the
concomitant demand for capital goods which, for lack
of the right kind of domestic supply, increased import
demand and thereby negated the beneficial spillover
effects for the rest of the productive structure. At that
time, the concepts of industrial policy, policy for the
manufacturing sector and incentive policies for capital
goods production were closely linked.
The main instrument of industrial policy was a
combination of trade protection, promotion of direct
investment (often by the State or from abroad), and
financing provided by national development banks. The
leading examples in the 1970s, before the rupture
produced by the external debt crisis, were the second
1 This study was prepared as part of the “Fomento al desarrollo
productivo” project, in the framework of the ECLAC/GTZ programme
“Modernization of the State, productive development and sustainable
use of natural resources”, and was presented at the second meeting
of the industrial policy task force (Rio de Janeiro, March 2005) of
the Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD). The author is particularly
grateful for the comments of Antonio Barros de Castro (the
presentation commentator), Alice Amsden, Mario Cimoli, Giovanni
Dosi, Bernardo Kosacoff, Yevgeny Kuznetsov, Richard Nelson,
Gabriel Palma and Gabriel Porcile. Parts of this paper were published
in ECLAC (2004a, chapter 8).
2 In this document, the terms “industry” and “industrial” are used in
a broad sense, i.e., they include not just manufacturing industry but
also non-manufacturing sectors such as agriculture and mining.
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Plano Nacional do Desenvolvimento (National
Development Plan) in Brazil and the Programa
Nacional de Fomento Industrial, 1979-1982 (National
Programme for Industrial Development, 1979-1982) in
Mexico, which was in operation during the boom that
accompanied the growth of the country’s oil export
platform.
Industrial policies were used to organize domestic
supply growth and provide a focus for planning or
programming in relation to the productive structure.
Three interrelated factors strengthened this organizing
role: (i) public-sector support mechanisms were
organized at the sectoral or even subsectoral level;3
(ii) private-sector interests were also organized in
sectoral chambers or associations, which were the main
defenders of the trade protection system; and
(iii) international trade negotiations (for example,
within the framework of the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA), the Central American Common
Market (CACM), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
or the Andean Pact) yielded negative or positive lists
of sectoral preferences. Industrial policies concentrated
on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, although
the preponderance of the latter was such that, as
mentioned earlier, the concepts of sectoral policy and
policy for the manufacturing sector tended to be
conflated.
After playing this central role, industrial policies
gradually lost legitimacy over the course of the 1980s,
to the extent that they were virtually absent from the
new economic model ushered in by structural reforms,
at least in its strictest version. Policies of this kind lost
credibility for a number of reasons. The main ones were:
the privatization or closure of public-sector enterprises
that invested directly in new sectors, since the new
vision for the State gave it only a subsidiary role in the
economic dynamic; the need to balance the public
finances by doing away with subsidies, particularly
those of a fiscal nature and the subsidy components of
lending operations; and the perception, sometimes a
questionable one, that many investments had involved
poor planning, faulty project management and
corruption, and indeed that some projects were no more
than pointless “white elephants”. This loss of legitimacy
did not occur everywhere in the world. Thus, for
example, in a number of East and South-East Asian
countries, active policies targeted on individual sectors
or even companies remained in force until well into
the 1990s, when they became less common as, albeit
at different paces, these countries gradually entered the
free market mainstream and the new international
trading regime.4
Whatever the merits of the economic arguments
against industrial policy, opposition to the new
economic model among the political supporters of this
policy served to consolidate the “developmentalists
versus neoliberals” stereotype. Supporters of structural
reform combated those who opposed it by stressing the
argument that sectoral industrial policies were to blame
for distorting the allocation of resources and creating
the fiscal imbalances that underlay inflation. A growing
number of governments in the region also took a critical
stance towards industrial policy.5  This extreme position
was not always matched by the reality, however; even
some governments that were strong reformers, such as
those of Menem in Argentina, Collor de Melo in Brazil
and Salinas de Gortari in Mexico, kept some sectoral
policies, particularly for the automotive industry.
3 For example, ministries of industry, agriculture, mining and others
and, within these, departments for food, metallurgy, chemicals,
capital goods, etc.
4 The debate about the effect of industrial policies in Asia is wide-
ranging and still inconclusive, although the 1997 crisis meant that
attention shifted from industrial policies to other issues where that
region was concerned. For positions favourable to these policies,
see Amsden (1989), Rodrik (1995) and Wade (1990), and for critical
positions see World Bank (1993), Krugman (1994) and, more
recently, Noland and Pack (2002). Again, the agricultural policies
of the industrialized countries show that sectoral policies are far
from being just a quirk of a few underdeveloped countries in the
past.
5 In the early 1990s, it was common to hear from top macroeconomic
policy officials the dictum that “the best industrial policy is no
industrial policy”. Simple as it was, this maxim summed up their
attitude quite well.
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II
Industrial policy practice and strategy
1. The experience of the region
Much of what the region is currently doing in industrial
policy is covered by the phrase “competitiveness
policies” (Peres, 1997).6  The policies now followed in
the region can be divided into four main groups:
(i) Policies that are a continuation of those developed
during the import substitution industrialization period
and that aim to expand and deepen a particular sector by
creating new segments within it and applying some
combination of trade protection and fiscal and financial
incentives. Prominent examples of these policies are the
automotive industry regimes created in Mercosur to
organize and expand investment by producers of cars
and car parts (ECLAC, 2004b, boxes III.3 and III.4). In
many of the region’s countries, there have been sporadic
measures to support sensitive (and uncompetitive) sectors
such as textiles, wearing apparel, footwear, electronic
products and toys, and a whole range of agricultural
products and mining activities, with details varying by
country; this support has been much more stable than
incentives for manufacturing. Even in sectors with
revealed comparative advantages, like some important
segments of the agricultural sector, it has often been
necessary to introduce schemes to help them cope with
short-term crises7  or longer-term challenges resulting
from a relative loss of competitiveness.8
In the agriculture sector, a number of countries
(including those of Central America, Brazil, Colombia
and the Dominican Republic) have continued to
intervene directly in markets for staple grains (wheat,
maize, rice). Increasingly, however, direct market
intervention (by means of guarantee prices, for
example) and subsidized credit are being replaced by
programmes aimed at small producers, who are the most
affected by trade liberalization, and by horizontal
instruments including, among others, spending on
animal and plant health programmes, irrigation and land
title schemes (FAO, 2001 and ECLAC, 2003). Growing
importance is also being given to territorial or local
programmes, such as fiscal incentives in poor regions
or integrated rural development schemes, so called
because they combine infrastructure investment with
training and technical assistance in relatively
disadvantaged rural areas.
(ii) Policies targeted on sectors, which have now
evolved into economy-wide policies. This is the case
with policies for the electronics and information
technology industry, which began as hardware import
substitution policies and were then used to support
software development, and which have now been
integrated into strategies to develop information and
communication technologies (ICTs) and even create
“information societies” in Latin America and the
Caribbean.9  Because there is widespread potential for
scope and network economies and for complementarity
between different activities, these policies need to be
transversal, transcending sectoral or institutional
boundaries that are in any case tending to blur.
(iii) Policies centred on highly concentrated sectors
and based on scale and network economies (electricity,
telecommunications, oil and natural gas). The aim of
policies in these sectors, almost all of which have been
6 The impact of economic reforms and macroeconomic policy on
the industrial dynamic is beyond the scope of this study. It should
be noted, however, that reforms such as trade liberalization and
privatization, and monetary and exchange-rate policies too, have
often had a strong influence on this dynamic, leading to their being
considered veritable “implicit industrial policies”. Such implicit
policies have often been decided on without adequate knowledge
of the region’s microeconomy, i.e., of the specific dynamics of its
businesses and markets (see Stallings and Peres, 2000).
7 For example, the tax exemptions for meat producers during the
foot-and-mouth crises in Uruguay, discussed by Scarone (2003).
Again, 2003 data for Brazil show significant support for a number
of sectors, including electricity (US$ 1 billion in credit lines from
the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico y Social,
BNDES, to capitalize 24 distribution companies), information
technology (US$ 500 million worth of reductions in the
industrialized products tax, or IPI), automobiles (US$ 120 million
worth of IPI reductions for small and medium-sized vehicles) and
household electrical appliances (US$ 70 million in credit lines).
See Balbi (2003).
8 As has happened with “sun and sand” tourism in much of the
English-speaking Caribbean (Hendrickson, 2003), or in Mexico
with agricultural conversion programmes to introduce crops with
greater potential, value-added and market opportunities, as an
objective of the Alianza para el Campo (Rural Alliance)
(Villagómez, 2003).
9 See ECLAC (2005) for a general approach to the subject; for national
analyses, see Bonelli and Motta Veiga (2003) on Brazil, Scarone
(2003) on Uruguay, and Henry (2003) on the Caribbean.
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settled upon since privatization, has been to develop
efficient frameworks of regulation, and this has meant
creating and building up regulatory agencies, adapting
the legal framework and striving to harness the growth
of investment in these sectors to the supply capacity of
domestic suppliers, a linkage that varies in strength from
one country to another.10  Brazil has gone so far as to
set up “technology funds” to support scientific and
technological development programmes in each of the
sectors concerned, funded from the royalties paid by
companies.
(iv) Policies to support clusters, particularly those
composed of small and medium-sized enterprises, or
of a large number of such enterprises under the
leadership of big firms. This approach has found
increasing acceptance in the Andean and Central
American countries and, like other industrial policies,
its purpose has been more to increase the
competitiveness of existing sectors than to create new
activities. In countries such as Mexico and Brazil,
vigorous measures have been taken to encourage these
clusters at the subnational level. This is illustrated in
the case of Mexico by the support given to the footwear
sector in Guanajuato and the electronics sector in Jalisco
(Unger, 2003; Dussel Peters, 1999), and in the case of
Brazil by the actions of the Brazilian Micro and Small
Business Support Service (SEBRAE) throughout the
country as part of the project to develop “local
production arrangements”.11  This type of policy enjoys
great legitimacy, even among international financial
organizations, and this has made it more acceptable to
governments and even led to some measures being
described as “support for clusters” when the activities
they assist do not qualify, strictly speaking, either as a
production chain or as a geographical cluster.12
2. A typology of national strategies
Following a resurgence of interest in active
microeconomic and sectoral policies in the mid-1990s,
three approaches to competitiveness policy were
shaped. Some countries, chiefly Brazil, Mexico and
those of the English-speaking Caribbean, produced
policy documents specifically oriented towards the
industrial sector and its linkages with technological
development and international trade.13  These
documents were not so much industrial plans or
programmes, strictly speaking, as shared working
agendas for government and the private sector, and this
led their critics to accuse them of being “programmes
without goals” and even “without resources”.
In the Andean and Central American countries, the
main thrust of policy was to raise the competitiveness of
the economy as a whole without giving any particular
priority to the industrial sector. National competitiveness
strategies were based on the cluster analysis methodology,
and clusters were referred to under a variety of names,
such as “aglomeraciones industriales”, “arreglos
productivos” and “conglomerados productivos”.14  In
practice, these approaches led to the negotiation and
implementation of sectoral agreements, generally
spanning value chains, between private-sector actors and
government, with the latter acting as a catalyst or facilitator.
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, lastly, did not work
on the basis of industrial policies or national
competitiveness strategies. Preference was given instead
to what are known as horizontal policies,15  which were
10 See Sergeant, Racha and James (2003) on Trinidad and Tobago.
11 In Portuguese, arranjos produtivos locais (APL). The characteristic
of these arrangements is that they cover a significant number of
businesses whose operations centre on a production activity that is
dominant in a particular territory and which share forms of
cooperation and governance mechanisms. APL support measures are
local, which is consistent with the Brazilian experience of state
policies with a strong sectoral component. Examples of these policies
are support programmes for the automotive industry (through
subsidies and even capital investments by some state governments),
the electrical, electronics and information technology industry,
textiles, wearing apparel and footwear. See Bonelli and Motta Veiga
(2003).
12 See Velasco (2003) regarding sectoral agreements in Colombia.
13 Pérez Caltendey (2003) highlights the importance of sectoral
incentives in Caribbean economies, particularly among the member
countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Barbados
and, most particularly, Guyana, which has the widest range of
incentives in the region. These incentives are basically designed
for the manufacturing and service sectors, particularly hotels and
tourism (Hendrickson, 2003).
14 This approach was based on Porter (1990) and given effect in the
work done by the Monitor Company in the Andean countries in the
early 1990s and in the project “Central America in the 21st century:
an agenda for competitiveness and sustainable development”,
coordinated by INCAE/Latin American Centre for Competitiveness and
Sustainable Development (CLADS) in the mid-1990s.
15 The expression “neutral or horizontal policies”, in widespread
use across the region, conceals the fact that any policy will ultimately
favour certain sectors over others. This happens because these
policies seek to raise the efficiency of production factor markets,
which are used in different proportions by the different sectors or
products. In some cases, policies that are presented as neutral to
give them greater legitimacy are oriented from the outset towards
specific sectors. This is usually the case with technological
development policies.
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supposed to be non-discriminating between sectors and
to be implemented by means of incentives to company
demand, by contrast with the supply subsidies that
characterized the earlier model. When problems with
a clear sectoral dimension arose, horizontal policies
instruments would be brought to bear on solving these,
without these policies being thereby deemed to have
lost their essentially neutral character. It was in Chile
that this type of intervention was conceptualized and
implemented most forcefully, although the country
long continued to provide direct subsidies to the
forestry and mining sectors and to export activities
(Moguillansky, 2000).
In the early 2000s, by contrast with what has been
happening in other development policy areas, there has
been no convergence in the positions of the Latin
American and Caribbean countries where sectoral
policies are concerned. While in some the official stance
is strongly against these policies (although sectoral
support is provided ad hoc), in others they are
recognized as a valid way of raising the competitiveness
of activities that have the potential to penetrate external
markets or that face strong competition from exports.
There are some double standards with these policies:
countries that deny their utility, particularly when it
comes to support for manufacturing, use them openly
and without any attempt at justification in numerous
areas of agriculture and services (tourism, for example).
Taking the historical analysis of policymaking that
has been presented here as a basis, the region’s countries
can be classified or ordered by three variables: the
purpose of the intervention, its frequency or intensity,
and the level of coordination between the policy
implementation measures taken as part of a broader
strategy.
Going by the purpose of intervention, three types
of countries can be distinguished, as noted above:
(i) those that have maintained or even revived sectoral
policies, (ii) those where sectoral policies essentially
concern clusters, and (iii) those that have not taken
either of these two approaches and only accept the use
of policies considered to be horizontal, although these
will sometimes be concentrated on a specific sector.
Horizontal policies are widely accepted in all three
types of countries. What distinguishes the first two types
are the policies they apply in addition to horizontal ones.
Table 1 highlights the use of development bank lending
and fiscal incentives oriented towards specific sectors.16
In seven of the region’s countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and
Mexico), public-sector development banks carry out
sector-oriented lending, while in 18 countries fiscal
incentives have been established for the benefit of
specific sectors. Only in Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Paraguay and Suriname do no such incentives
exist. An even commoner type of incentive is the
existence of special rules that favour the creation of free-
trade export zones or maquila industries.
Taken together, this information immediately
reveals one difference from the practices associated
with the earlier model. Whereas preference was given
then to manufacturing, this is now one of the sectors
with the least weight. The activities most favoured have
been tourism, commodity sectors such as oil, mining
and forestry, and miscellaneous services (ranging from
infrastructure to film-making). The importance of
agriculture-oriented policies varies appreciably among
the region’s countries if it is measured by the public
funds spent on implementing them (including
productive development programmes, rural
infrastructure investments and social spending in rural
areas).17  Public-sector development banks, meanwhile,
make an important contribution to the financing of this
sector in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic and Mexico (Acevedo,
2002). Generally speaking, lending is carried out on
near-market terms and interest rate subsidies are
retained in programmes to support small-scale farming.
The above description needs to be modified
somewhat in the light of the lending portfolios of the
six development banks in five of the region’s countries.
Industry still receives about half of all loans from the
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e
Social (BNDES) in Brazil, the Banco Nacional de
Comercio Exterior (BANCOMEXT) in Mexico and the
Banco de Comercio Exterior de Colombia
(BANCOLDEX), while it accounts for about 25% of the
total portfolio of the Corporación Financiera de
Desarrollo (COFIDE) in Peru and less than 15% of the
portfolios of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR)
and Mexico’s Nacional Financiera (NAFIN). Given that
BANCOLDEX and BANCOMEXT lending is for foreign trade
financing, of the six institutions only BNDES seems to
16 The amount of implicit subsidy in lending operations and fiscal
incentives cannot be determined from the information available.
17 In Chile and Mexico, annual expenditure per producer totalled
US$ 900 in 2000, whereas in Bolivia it was less than US$ 50. That
same year, agricultural spending as a proportion of the sector’s GDP
was 35% in Mexico, 21% in Chile and just over 5% in Bolivia
(Kerrigan, 2001).
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play an important role in the financing of domestic
market-oriented production activity in the industrial
sector; in 2002, its operations exceeded US$ 5.8 billion
(ECLAC, 2004a, table 8.2).18
The second variable allows the countries of the
region to be differentiated by the frequency or intensity
with which they conduct sectoral policies: (i) countries
that implement a wide range of sectoral policies (such
as Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Mexico, Uruguay, the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela); (ii) countries that
implement them for only a small number of activities
(Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Peru, among
TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Sector-specific financial and fiscal incentives
Country Lending to specific sectors, except agriculture Fiscal incentives for specific sectors
Argentina Capital goods Mining, forestry
Bahamas Hotels, financial services, beer and alcoholic beverages
Barbados Financial services, insurance, information technologies, tourism
Belize Mining
Bolivia Mining
Brazil Oil, natural gas, textiles, wearing apparel, Automotive industry, electronics
footwear, shipping industry, electricity,
telecommunications, software, film-making
Chile Forestry, oil, nuclear materials
Colombia Film-making
Costa Rica Various sectors Forestry, tourism
Ecuador Mining, tourism
El Salvador Mining, services (tourism, transport,
software and others)
Guatemala
Guyana Agroindustry, forestry, mining, tourism, fishing, construction,
information and communication technologies (ICTs)
Haiti
Honduras Transport, shrimp
Jamaica Film-making, tourism, bauxite, aluminium, factory construction





Peru Tourism, mining, oil
Dominican Republic Tourism, agroindustry
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago Hydrocarbons, tourism, construction
Uruguay Mutton, vineyards and wine, hydrocarbons, printing, forestry,
military-industrial, airlines, newspapers, radio stations, theatres,
film-making
Venezuela (Bolivarian Hydrocarbons and purchases of capital goods and services for
Republic of) investments in primary sectors (oil, mining, agriculture and
fishing).
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Melo (2001, table 3).
18 The “Others” category of the NAFIN portfolio, accounting for 97%
of the total, probably includes operations oriented towards the
domestic production sector.
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others); and (iii) countries where these policies are
almost non-existent (such as Haiti, Paraguay and
Suriname). Besides the information provided by table 1,
the intensity with which sectoral policies are
implemented can also be gauged from measures that
do not involve fiscal and financial subsidies, as in the
case of Colombia, where there is a very active policy
of sectoral agreements that do not include incentives
of this type, or El Salvador, a country that has an active
policy of supporting clusters (Alonso, 2003).
In Mexico, since the Política Económica para la
Competitividad (Economic Policy for Competitiveness)
was inaugurated in 2002, 12 priority production
branches have been chosen to benefit from sectoral
programmes: four of these are in operation (for the fibre,
textiles and wearing apparel chain; for leather and
footwear; for the electronics and high technology
industry; and for software) and there has been progress
with some programmes for the automotive industry,
export maquila and chemicals.19  In November 2003,
meanwhile, the Government of Brazil published its
industrial, technological and external trade policy
guidelines, setting out its strategic sectoral options in
four knowledge-intensive production activities
(semiconductors, software, pharmaceuticals and
medicines, and capital goods), and created a special
body to coordinate implementation of this policy, the
Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial
(Brazilian Industrial Development Agency).20
In some countries (Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay,
among others), promotional measures have been
targeted even more closely, to the extent that support
has been given to the individual projects of particular
companies. Some examples are the incentives for
investment in megaprojects in the Peruvian mining
sector,21  the measures taken by the government of
Costa Rica so that INTEL would establish an operation
in the country,22  and tax exemptions to support projects
declared to be of national interest in Uruguay.23
The third variable, the level of coordination
between the measures applied, requires consideration
of a further dimension that concerns the logic of the
policies on which they are based: the question of
whether or not they are integrated into a broader
national strategy. Three types of countries need to be
distinguished, then: those that take frequent measures
as part of explicit public intervention strategies, usually
expressed in official plans or programmes (Brazil,
Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico, for example);
countries that intervene frequently, but without an
explicit strategy (Costa Rica, Uruguay) and countries
that intervene sporadically (the great majority).
The three variables considered have remained very
stable in each of the countries over time, which is
indicative of competence and experience in policy
formulation and application. Changes of government,
even when they have meant a sharp break with a
country’s political past, as in Mexico in 2000 or
Uruguay in 2005, have not led to great alterations in
policy stances. Two examples, albeit tending in opposite
directions, are the relative unimportance of sectoral
policies that is still a feature of Chile, and the continuity
of efforts to formulate and maintain sectoral agreements
(export competitiveness pacts) in Colombia over the
administrations of presidents Samper, Pastrana and
Uribe, involving as they do 41 production chains and
sectors responsible for 86% of non-traditional
exports.24
19 The other five branches of industry are aerospace, agriculture,
tourism, commerce and construction (Secretaría de Economía, 2003).
20 The document states that these sectors were chosen because (i)
they display increasing and sustained dynamism; (ii) they account
for large shares of international research and development
investment; (iii) they open up new business opportunities; (iv)
they are directly linked to innovation in processes, products and
forms of use; (v) they increase the density of the industrial fabric;
and (vi) they are important for the future of the country and have
potential for the development of dynamic comparative advantages
(Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior,
2003, p. 16).
21 The main support policies for the Peruvian mining sector in the
1990s were: promotion of and guarantees for foreign direct
investment; privatization of State enterprises; approval of a
framework law guaranteeing free enterprise and private investments;
tax, currency and administrative stability; modernization of the
mining concession process; fiscal benefits (reinvested profits are
free of income tax); fiscal incentives for investment in megaprojects
(income tax exemptions and accelerated recovery of the general
sales tax). See Fairlie (2003).
22 See Alonso (2003).
23 The 1998 investments law promotes specific investments, the
requirement being a declaration by the executive that a particular
project is of national interest. Benefits may be general or favour
only the project concerned (e.g., exemption from the asset tax on
movable goods). General benefits may be automatic (e.g., exemption
from the asset tax on movable goods for use in the production cycle)
or discretionary (the regulations for this had yet to be issued as of
mid-2003). See Scarone (2003).
24 Of these chains and sectors, 31 are national and 10 regional; 29
produce goods and 12 services. Strictly speaking, not all the
programmes concern production chains, since the sectors covered
include potatoes, farmed shrimp, tuna, wild shrimp, flowers, coffee
and bananas. The production chain concept was not rigorously
applied because these agreements were signed for “practical reasons”
in an effort to bring businesses on board (Velasco, 2003).
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Positive though these examples of institutional
maturity are, their implications should not be overstated,
because the experience of the region also abounds in
examples of programmes established to palliate
efficiency problems that have led to crises.25  Even the
policy for the Brazilian automotive industry has features
suggestive of a rescue for a struggling sector that cannot
withstand external competition or, to use the term
current in the 1980s, of an industrial restructuring
exercise (Bonelli and Motta Veiga, 2003).
III
Lines of action and instruments
As the specialized literature has often pointed out,26
competitiveness policies in the region, even those that are
fundamentally sectoral in scope, have concerned
themselves far more with increasing the efficiency of
existing sectors than with creating new ones, something
that is consistent with a quest for greater international
market share relying chiefly on static comparative
advantages (unskilled labour and natural resources). This
has happened both in countries with a diversified
production structure (Brazil and Mexico, among others)
and in countries with more specialized structures. Of the
former it might be said that only a very few sectors are
wholly absent from their economies and that sectoral
policies should be detected at the individual product level.
While this is true, the evidence suggests that, particularly
in Brazil and to a lesser extent in Mexico,27  sectoral type
measures have focused on strengthening and expanding
established sectors, the most noteworthy example being
the automotive industry, as indicated earlier.
The creation of new activities comes up sporadically
as a policy objective, and two main lines of action have
been followed to this end: international trade negotiations
to secure market access, chiefly through bilateral or
multilateral free trade agreements, and efforts to attract
foreign direct investment (FDI) to develop export platforms,
including free trade zone and maquila activities.
Attracting FDI has been the main mechanism used to
create new sectors in most of the region’s countries.
Measures of this kind include the deepening of the
Mexican export platform within the framework of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (cars and car parts,
electronics and clothing), more elementary first-generation
maquila activities in some Central American and
Caribbean countries (wearing apparel) and investments
in privatized service and commodity sectors in South
American countries (Mortimore, 2000; Peres and
Reinhardt, 2000). The activities leading to the
diversification of production structures have largely been
determined by the different combinations of strategies
followed by investing multinationals, on the one hand,
and government sectoral policies, on the other, albeit with
the limitations deriving from low value-added (owing to
the preponderance of assembly activities) and a lack of
linkages with the rest of the national economy concerned.
The instruments that have been used to attract
foreign investment can be classified into three major
groups (Mortimore and Peres, 1998): (i) incentives,
chiefly in the form of free trade zones and fiscal
benefits, (ii) the use of standards to create an efficient
business environment (rule of law, transparency,
assured access to international markets, good
infrastructure, etc.) and (iii) the creation of specialized
factors of production, particularly skilled labour. The
countries of the region have applied these three types
of instruments to differing degrees; with few
exceptions, however, it is the first two that predominate.
Besides specific instruments to attract foreign
investment, countries have used two others that apply
to any kind of investment (domestic or foreign). These
are the financial and fiscal incentives shown in table 1
and a large group of measures used by governments to
create competitive environments for companies to work
in (pro-competition measures and the regulation of
monopoly sectors), lower transaction costs (by reducing
administrative controls, among other things) or enable
companies to act collectively to take advantage of
economies of scale (sectoral agreements spanning
production chains, support for partnerships between
companies, etc.).
25 See Scarone (2003) concerning a large portion of the policies
applied in Uruguay and Villagómez (2003) concerning the 2002-
2010 programme for the electronics industry in Mexico.
26 See IDB (2001), Melo (2001) and Peres (1997).
27 See Bonelli and Motta Veiga (2003) on Brazil, and Unger (2003)
and Villagómez (2003) on Mexico.
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The policies formulated in the region can be
grouped as follows, in accordance with the degree of
acceptance they have attained: winning policies, losing
policies and emerging policies (Peres, 1997). Winning
policies are those that have been generally accepted by
governments, i.e., that have strong legitimacy. In
addition to the export promotion and inward FDI policies
already mentioned, this group includes policies to
promote technological development, human resources
development, small businesses and microenterprises
(usually in the form of support for the creation or
strengthening of business networks or clusters) and
productive development at the local or subnational
level, these two last being very closely intertwined.
These policies have proved so acceptable because of
their perceived neutrality, since they operate on markets
for production factors (technology and training), or
because of their perceived positive impact on job
creation, especially at the subnational or local level.
Losing policies, meanwhile, are those that are more
clearly inconsistent with the current development model,
particularly trade liberalization and public-sector deficit
reduction. They include direct fiscal subsidies, directed
lending and the use of subsidized interest rates, tariffs
on foreign trade and the use of the State’s purchasing
power. Concerning this last, the situation varies from
one country to another. While some use this instrument
at the national or subnational level, as in the support
programme for software production in Mexico already
referred to, others regard it as being outside the range of
applicable policies because it would go against objectives
of spending efficiency and transparency.
Emerging policies, lastly, such as pro-competition
measures, improvements to corporate governance regimes,
regulation of infrastructure sectors whose markets do not
operate efficiently, and corporate social responsibility, are
acquiring growing legitimacy, but are still maturing and
are at very different stages of development in the region’s
countries. Some have modern legislation and fairly solid
institutions with which to implement these policies, while
in others they are still at the stage of debate and decision-
making, or are not a major item on the agenda.
National differences notwithstanding, the region
has displayed a high degree of convergence in the
content of policy documents over the last decade. There
are four basic elements around which this convergence
has taken place: (i) an emphasis on raising international
competitiveness, (ii) horizontal or neutral instruments,
whose legitimacy has become firmly established even
though, as noted earlier, their effects in practice are far
from neutral, (iii) support for small businesses and
microenterprises, basically because of their capacity
to generate jobs, and (iv) the targeting of subnational
or local economic areas. Programmes to support clusters
are the leading manifestation of at least three of these
elements, the Brazilian programme of support for local
production arrangements (APL) being perhaps the most




Efforts to evaluate the implementation and effects of
industrial policies are constrained not only by the
information available, but also by the fact that, until
very recently, these policies rarely specified which
criteria and mechanisms should be used for evaluating
them. The problem is compounded by the technical
complexities involved in evaluating policies that have
multiple objectives and lines of action.
1. Evaluating policy implementation
While there are data on the funding allocated to certain
policies (actually programmes or projects),28  the
information is insufficient to evaluate implementation
overall. Despite this, it has been shown that, with some
exceptions, the degree of policy implementation in Latin
America and the Caribbean is still low, as indicated in
28 The best-documented cases concern the amounts allocated to
agricultural policies, in particular those forming part of large
programmes such as PROCAMPO, the Alianza para el Campo (Rural
Alliance) and the Programa de Apoyo a la Comercialización
(Marketing Support Programme) in Mexico. See Kjöllerström
(2004), Villagómez (2003) on Mexico and Scarone (2003) on
Uruguay.
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Peres (1997); particularly clear analyses are provided
by Alonso (2003) concerning the situation of the five
Central American countries and Fairbanks and Lindsay
(1997) concerning the Andean countries that designed
competitiveness strategies around the concept of
clusters.
According to these studies, the causes behind
widespread policy implementation failures (i.e.,
“government failures”), and the resultant gap between
what is decided and what is actually done, fall into a
number of categories, as shown below.
a) Non-operational or unattainable objectives
The inclusion of non-operational or unattainable
objectives in policy formulation transfers real
implementation decisions to the budgetary allocation
stage. The problem in these cases is that because of
shortcomings in their formulation, policies tend to be
more akin to declarations of intent than to resource
allocation instruments. Evaluation of the 41 sectoral
agreements in Colombia to determine the factors
conductive to success shows that: (i) agreements
containing well-structured, quantifiable and time-
limited commitments are easier to follow and
implement; (ii) agreements comprising just a few simple
commitments achieve greater results; (iii) the leadership
and decision-making capabilities of the people behind
the agreements are fundamental; and (iv) production
chains that had been supported since before the
agreements achieved better results.29  The practice
followed in the region does not usually take these
success factors into account. Thus, policy documents
tend to end up as veritable “shopping lists” of needs
and objectives. While the multiplicity of objectives may
be due to the action of numerous agents in complex
societies, it also reflects a certain inability to set
priorities and build consensus around a few that can
realistically be achieved.
b) Shortages of human and financial resources
Shortages of the human and financial resources
needed for policy implementation, especially serious
in smaller and poorer countries, often mean reliance
on external resources (lending or aid) to make policy
and, especially, to enforce it. When policies are rolled
out, furthermore, their cost and the consequent
financing needs are not usually considered, the
approach being once again “decide first and then see
what can be done and how it can be afforded”.
c) Lack of institutional capabilities
Almost all the countries in the region are deficient
in the institutional capabilities needed to implement
policies, even some quite straightforward ones. The
difficulties increase when countries try to introduce
policies that are more a reflection of “international best
practice” than of their own actual needs. This results in
policy formulations that are detached from reality and,
worse still, are often sponsored by State agencies with
little weight in the government power structure or by
business associations that are unrepresentative and have
little economic or political influence. The problem is
compounded by the fact that policymaking and
implementation authorities are usually separated in the
region. Although countries can increase their
institutional capacity over time, and some in the region
have done so, institutional creativity and innovation
require stability of objectives over longer periods than
the four- to six-year terms that are the norm for
governments in Latin America and the Caribbean,
together with financial resources to make action
possible. The great disparity in tax burdens between
the different countries of the region, ranging from under
10% to over 30% of GDP, means there are structural
differences in the potential for progress in this area.
d) The unreliability of public-private agreements
Policy implementation agreements between
government and the private sector are unreliable, as
transpires when the time comes for the public sector to
release funds or for the private sector to make matching
investment and spending commitments. Furthermore,
there is a proliferation of plans and programmes that
are only produced in reaction to political pressure from
economic actors, or as a means of soliciting
international financing, or to comply with legal or
constitutional provisions. Businesses, which vigorously
defended protection policies until the late 1970s, are
not showing the same robust commitment to policies
for diversifying and improving productive
specialization in the region’s countries.30
e) The weakness of economic signals
Implementation problems are compounded, in the
case of industrial policies, by the weakness of the
economic signals sent out by programmes to expand
29 See Velasco (2003).
30 Again, while disagreements between governments and the private
sector have diminished, they have by no means disappeared, as
Alonso (2003) points out in relation to Guatemala and Scarone
(2003) in relation to Uruguay.
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activities or create new ones. By contrast with the vigour
and clarity of the signal associated with the trade
protection typical of the import substitution
industrialization model, which made it possible to set
domestic prices and maximize profitability, what
businesses are now offered, at best, is a set of signals
which are difficult to interpret and translate into concrete
measures, and whose implications for profitability are
uncertain. It should not be surprising, then, if the
perception that “policies don’t work” is widespread.
Implementation failures and the perception that
“policies don’t work” affect the legitimacy of industrial
policies and the interest they may arouse among
businesses, their main beneficiaries. This leads to a
paradoxical situation: businesses consider that the
resources available for policy implementation are
inadequate, and yet they do not make full use of them.
Finding out how to overcome implementation failures
and make policies work is one of the main challenges
for development strategies.
Despite the implementation failures referred to,
there has been progress with the relationship between
the public authorities and business associations (or
chambers) at the policymaking stage and, in a few cases,
at the implementation stage. Public-private dialogue
has been strengthening since the early 1990s, although
there are still conflicts, and has progressed to the point
where business organizations often take the lead in
proposing policy initiatives. This has happened with the
Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) in Colombia,
the Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Transformación
(CANACINTRA) in Mexico, the Asociación de Industriales
de República Dominicana (AIRD) in the Dominican
Republic, the Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica (CICR)
in Costa Rica and the Federación de Cámaras Industriales
de Centroamérica (FECAICA), a body which promoted an
industrial modernization agenda in Central America in
the 1990s. In these and other countries, then, it is possible
to speak of shared public-private responsibility in
policymaking, rather than just discussion and consensus-
seeking (Peres, 1997).
Business associations have also participated to
varying degrees in forums to negotiate competitiveness-
boosting measures, such as the Consejo Nacional de
Competitividad in Colombia, the Foro de Desarrollo
Productivo in Chile and the “sectoral chambers” in
Brazil.31  In some cases, they have gone so far as to
make long-term proposals to endow policies with
stability beyond the individual terms of governments;
this happened, for instance, with Visión 2020, an
initiative of the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (CONCAMIN).
The policymaking role of other civil society
organizations has been much weaker. Although labour
unions have been represented in policy consensus
forums, they have not had a decisive influence on their
dynamic, with few exceptions; one such was the role
played by the union organization in the “sectoral
chamber” of the Brazilian automotive industry. Other
bodies have played even less of a role, an exception
being the participation of academics in the Consejo
Nacional de Competitividad (National Council for
Competitiveness) in Colombia.
2. Evaluating policy impact
The steps taken to evaluate the effects of industrial
policies have been as limited and unsatisfactory as the
efforts to evaluate their implementation, if not more
so. There have been evaluations of some specific
programmes, such as small business support
programmes in Chile,32  plus general evaluations of
what has happened after policies have been applied,
but without any effort being made to show that the
policies have been the cause of the developments
described. Some evaluations of this type have dealt with
the increase in non-traditional exports from production
chains with sectoral agreements in Colombia (Velasco,
2003), the increase in mining exports from Peru (Fairlie,
2003), improvements in the incomes of rural producers
and indeed in the productivity of their farms following
the large agricultural programmes in Mexico
(Villagómez, 2003), and the discussion as to whether or
not producers supported by the National Institute for
Agricultural Development (INDAP) in Chile have increased
their autonomous incomes (Kjöllerström, 2004).
What can be done to close the gap between what
is decided and announced, and what is actually done
and evaluated? Three lines of action, which are not
mutually exclusive, look promising and should be
followed up.
First, policymaking should be accompanied, not
followed, by explicit considerations as to which
institutions are responsible for implementation. This
31 In Brazil, the expression “sectoral chamber” does not indicate an
employers’ association but a tripartite negotiating forum (State,
businesses and workers).
32 See Silva and Sandoval (2003) for evaluations of support
programmes in Chile.
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means that those involved with industrial policy will
have to venture into matters of State reform. The State
is still structured around the organization of production
sectors and subsectors, whereas the aim now is to apply
system-wide or transversal policies which, by
definition, will cover more than one sector or more than
one implementing agency. This is particularly important
in the case of policies that were strictly sectoral to begin
with but have since become general, such as strategies
to support the spread and use of information and
communication technologies, whose transversal
character has already been noted. Reform of the State
and the institutional development that this entails are
not subjects familiar to industrial organization
specialists, but they need to be addressed if
implementation failures are to be reduced.
Given the shortage of qualified human resources
in those areas of the State that are involved in policy
implementation, a second line of action would be to
transfer to these areas highly qualified staff who are
currently engaged in policymaking. This would not
undermine capacity-building efforts, since these efforts
are necessarily long-term while the reallocation of
human resources can be short-term. Reallocation of this
kind is bound to be costly, of course, in terms of both
efficiency and individual careers, but it is an alternative
that deserves consideration once it is accepted that there
is a large discrepancy between stated aims and the actual
measures taken.
A third line of action is to develop and strengthen
policy operators, i.e., institutions and individuals who
combine policymaking capabilities with a capacity for
action. This can be done by reinforcing public
institutions, seeking out leaders in the private sector
and bolstering intermediate agents such as business
associations and non-governmental organizations.
Long-term institutional development within the
State is something that is already under way in ministries
responsible for macroeconomic policy and in central
banks in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the
agricultural and extractive sectors, too, many countries
in the region have created and maintained vigorous
institutions, examples being the Empresa Brasileira de
Pesquisa Agropecuária (EMBRAPA), an agricultural
research organization in Brazil, and the oil institutes of
Mexico and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This
experience can and must be emulated in areas linked to
the development of other production sectors. Private-
sector policy leadership has been efficient in some cases
(the formation of certain clusters at the local level, for
example), and needs to be employed whenever possible,
but it has proved difficult to systematize in the region
and its distribution has not matched implementation
needs. Thus, economically weak sectors, which need
major efforts from policy operators, tend to be weak in
leadership as well. Strengthening intermediate-level
implementation bodies has been a successful strategy in
countries such as Chile, where it has been used for
programmes to support productive linkages (PROFO),
although the predictable problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard have not gone away.
None of these measures is a panacea, nor will
implementation be easy. They do open up new options,
however, and deserve to be considered from




This study has shown that the countries of Latin
America and the Caribbean have policy options for
improving their productive specialization, and that they
have used them. Three types of policies have been
shaped in the region in the light of the objectives,
experience and economic and institutional capacity of
the individual countries. More particularly, the
measures designed range from industrial policies in the
strict sense of the term to what are basically horizontal
policies focused on particular sectors and support for
clusters with a value chain approach (Porter, 1990).
Industrial policies are the core of specialization or
diversification strategies. With strategies of this type,
there are four major aspects to be considered: the criteria
for deciding which sectors to support, the policy
instruments available, the constraints imposed by the
size of national markets and accumulated capabilities
in the different countries of the region, and the political
will to take measures of this type.
The choice of sectors must set out from the
recognition that there are no universal criteria for
deciding which activities ought to be promoted. There
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is a large body of international experience, however,
which shows that in practice countries have chosen and
continue to choose sectors in accordance with a few more
or less precise criteria. Chief among these criteria are
the knowledge content of the activities concerned,
dynamism in the international market because of a high
level of elasticity in relation to world income and
especially the income of developed countries, and
potential for productivity growth. Another consideration
is the strategic character of certain activities, essentially
because they account for a large share of total output,
exports or employment, usually at the national level but
sometimes at the local or subnational level as well. The
review of policies in the previous sections provides a
good illustration of how these criteria are used, not always
explicitly, in the countries of the region.
Since the 1980s, the technology dimension has
been increasingly important for determining the scope
of industrial policies. Although the term “sector” has
traditionally been applied to groups of activities whose
common feature is the production of goods or services
with a high cross-elasticity of demand, it can also be
used for activities that have a common technological
development path (Robinson, 1953); thus, we speak of
the aerospace sector, the biotechnology sector and the
information and communication technology sector.
When it comes to encouraging activities that share a
particular technology, the focus has sometimes been
on horizontal policies, while at other times intervention
has been focused directly on particular companies,
market segments or knowledge networks. Just as
industrial policies designed to create linkages between
production activities have tended to concentrate on
supporting clusters, in the field of technology they are
almost indistinguishable from technological
development or innovation policies.
As policies become systemic in scope, special
attention needs to be paid to their impact on the
conditions for competitiveness in the economy as a
whole. The extra costs associated with the early phases
of learning curves must not be so great that they
jeopardize the competitiveness of the businesses using
the new goods or services, especially if these businesses
are strongly oriented towards external trade. It is not
easy to strike the right balance between supporting
diversification of the nation’s productive apparatus and
taking advantage of opportunities to import cheaper or
technologically superior capital goods and inputs; this
balance can only be sought through experimentation
and trial and error, i.e., through policies of a pragmatic
rather than doctrinaire cast. Since pragmatic policies
tend to be reactive, a major challenge for the region is
to combine pragmatism with much more proactive
policies.
The instruments available for implementing
policies of this kind are well known and are utilized by
policymakers in the Latin American and Caribbean
countries. By contrast with the former situation in the
region and elsewhere, however, economies are now
open and it is not possible to use permanent, across-
the-board trade protection instruments. This constraint
weakens the economic signal (expected returns) sent
out to potential investors in new activities and means
that a significant part of the cost of promotional
measures has to be met by the State. This creates
problems both for the selection of budget priorities and
for the stability of budgetary allocations at times of
fiscal tightening. Sustaining development mechanisms
over the long run so that they outlast individual terms
of government is a challenge that the countries of the
region have yet to address successfully. Another
powerful instrument of sectoral policy, direct State
investment, is off the agenda in many of the region’s
countries; yet there is a great deal of room for
manoeuvre in this area, as a number of cases show,
particularly at the local or subnational level. The
experience of the region suggests that while the
cumulative effects of the policy combinations applied
so far have yet to be evaluated, the inducements they
create are weaker than those offered by protection in
its day.
It has been argued that small countries with more
limited institutional capacity should not and cannot
introduce policies that are sectoral in scope. While it is
certainly important that the domestic market could be
used to achieve economies of scale and learning, it
cannot be denied that this is less of an issue in open
economies, as shown by the experience of numerous
small countries that operate as highly competitive
export platforms. That institutional capacity is a
significant requirement is not in doubt, particularly in
the short term, but the fact of its being limited does not
mean that sector-wide activities need be ruled out, but
rather that they should be focused on subsectors,
segments or even products for which existing
capabilities suffice. The alternative is to scale down
the efforts made and not take “leaps in the dark”. The
experience of the region with cluster policies reveals
that even small countries have succeeded in creating
policies to improve their pattern of specialization.
Despite these considerations, there is no consistent
political will to implement sectoral initiatives in the
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region. They have more legitimacy in some countries
(although never as much as the earlier import
substitution industrialization model) and much less, or
none, in others. Even in countries that do not regard
sectoral policies as legitimate, however, they are still
practised, albeit in a much more ad hoc way, and
specific support measures are often applied to crisis-
hit sectors. Given that these policies are necessary for
development in the region, the question is what has to
be done to increase their legitimacy.
Two lines of action are paramount. First, there is a
need to improve implementation capacity to narrow the
gap between the policies formulated and the ability of
institutions to put them into effect; the persistence of
this gap damages the credibility of policymakers, and
thence of the policies themselves. Second, considerable
progress is needed in the task of evaluating the impact
of policies in relation to their ultimate objectives:
economic growth, technological progress, higher
productivity. Given the scarcity of public resources,
only robust evaluations can create the scope for
reallocating resources from other policy areas to these.
These observations are not new, but they are
crucial.33  There have been advances, as is illustrated
by the Programa de Desarrollo Empresarial de México
2001-2006, a Mexican business development
programme which makes explicit reference to
quantitative targets,34  thus showing a clear
improvement over earlier programmes. Progress in the
region as a whole has certainly been inadequate,
however. This is seriously affecting policies which have
to compete for fiscal resources with others that enjoy
great legitimacy, such as basic education, public health
and civic security, and which have to justify their very
existence. Given that they are essential for diversifying
the production apparatus and laying the groundwork
for faster productivity growth, industrial policies need
to regain legitimacy, and to do this they have to show
that they work.
From a broader perspective, a crucial question
remains open. Even if policies for diversifying the
production structure could demonstrate their technical
ability to generate positive impacts, it would not be
clear which social agents would be interested in seeing
these policies applied on a wide scale in the region’s
countries, i.e., which agents would pledge their
economic and political resources to initiatives of this
type that went beyond the promotion of clusters, the
great majority of which are in any case far from well-
funded. Industrial policies have made a slow comeback
in the region and have been able to operate, albeit on a
small scale, in open economies with orthodox
macroeconomic policies, despite the prior belief that
the latter would be incompatible with the use of
industrial policies. For these policies to have more than
a marginal impact, social actors, including the State,
will have to commit themselves to them and back them
up with their authority and resources. And here the
fundamental question arises: who has or might have an
interest in proactive industrial policies while at the same
time possessing the strength and resources to alter the
current pattern of productive specialization?
(Original: Spanish)
33 This idea has been highlighted in Peres (1997), Stallings and
Peres (2000) and Peres and Stumpo (2002).
34 The programme proposes the creation of a public evaluation
system to include strategic indicators, oversight mechanisms,
mechanisms for coordination and participation in evaluation work,
periodic reporting and an observatory of small and medium-sized
businesses and microenterprises to act as an information source
(Secretaría de Economía, 2001, p. 56).
Bibliography
Acevedo, R. (2002): ALIDE y el financiamiento de la agricultura y
el medio rural, document presented at the rural conference
“Desarrollo de las economías rurales en América Latina y el
Caribe: manejo sostenible de los recursos naturales, acceso a
tierras y finanzas rurales” (Fortaleza, Ceará, Brazil, 7 March).
Alonso, E. (2003): Centroamérica: políticas para el fomento de los
sectores productivos en Centroamérica, LC/L.1926-P,
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC). United Nations publication, Sales
No. S.03.II.G.83.
Amsden, A. (1989): Asia’s Next Giant, South Korea and Late
Industrialization, New York, Oxford University Press.
Balbi, S. (2003): Crise e divergência travam política industrial, Folha
dinheiro, São Paulo, 2 November.
Bonelli, R. and P. Motta Veiga (2003): A dinâmica das
po l í t i cas  se to r ia i s  no  Bras i l  na  década  de  1990:
continuidade e mudança, ECLAC/GTZ regional project “A
natural resource-cluster development strategy: its growth,
distributive and environmental implications”, Santiago,
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC).
Castaldi, C. (2003): Essays on the Process of Economic Growth,
Pisa, Italy, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna.
Cimoli, M., N. Correa and A. Primi (2003): Crecimiento y
estructura productiva en economías abiertas: lecciones
de la experiencia de América Latina, Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for  Lat in America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC).
Chang, H. (1994): The Political Economy of Industrial Policy,
London, Macmillan Press.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 8  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 682
THE SLOW COMEBACK OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  •  WILSON PERES
Dussel Peters, E. (1999): La subcontratación como proceso de
aprendizaje: el caso de la electrónica en Jalisco (México) en
la década de los noventa, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 55,
LC/L.1183-P, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). United Nations
publication, Sales No. S.99.II.G.16.
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)
(2003): Istmo centroamericano: los retos de la sustentabilidad
en granos básicos, LC/MEX/L.554, Mexico City, ECLAC
Subregional Headquarters in Mexico.
(2004a): Productive development in open economies, LC/
G.2234(SES.30/3), Santiago, Chile.
(2004b): Foreign Investment in Latin America and the
Caribbean, 2003, LC/G.2226-P, Santiago, Chile. United
Nations publication, Sales No. E.04.II.G.54.
(2005): Public policies for the development of information
societies in Latin America and the Caribbean, LC/W.19,
Santiago, Chile, June.
Fairbanks, M. and S. Lindsay (1997): Plowing the Sea: Nurturing
the Hidden Resources of Growth in the Developing World,
Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School Publishing.
Fairlie, A. (2003): Políticas sectoriales y cadenas productivas en el
Perú reciente, ECLAC/GTZ regional project “A natural resource-
cluster development strategy: its growth, distributive and
environmental implications”, Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations)
(2001): Review of Basic Food Policies, Rome.
Hendrickson, M. (2003): Caribbean Tourism: Trends, Policies and
Impact, 1985-2002, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Henry, L. (2003): Sectoral Policies: Information and Communications
Technology in the Caribbean. Trends, Policies and Impact,
1985-2002, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), July.
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) (2001): Competitividad:
el motor del crecimiento, Progreso económico y social en
América Latina. Informe 2001, Washington, D.C.
Kaldor, N. (1966): Causes of the Slow Rate of Growth of the United
Kingdom, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Kerrigan, G. (2001): Gasto público hacia el sector agrícola y
desarrollo de las áreas rurales: ALC, tendencias y desafíos,
consultancy report, Santiago, Chile, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), August.
Kjöllerström, M. (2004): Competitividad del sector agrícola y
pobreza rural: el papel de los gastos públicos en América
Latina, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 155, LC/L.2137-P,
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC), May. United Nations publication, Sales
No. S.04.II.G.66.
Krugman, P. (1994): The myth of Asia’s miracle, Foreign Affairs,
vol. 73, No. 6, New York, Council on Foreign Relations,
November-December.
Melo, A. (2001): Industrial Policy in Latin America and the
Caribbean at the Turn of the Century, Working paper, No.
459, Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), August.
Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior
(2003): Diretrizes de política industrial, tecnológica e de
comércio exterior, Brasilia, 20 November.
Moguillansky, G. (2000): La inversión en Chile. ¿El final de un ciclo
de expansión?, Santiago, Chile, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Mortimore, M. (2000): Corporate strategies for FDI in the context of
Latin America’s new economic model, World Development,
vol. 28, No. 9, Amsterdam, Elsevier, September.
Mortimore, M. and W. Peres (1998): Policy competition for foreign
direct investment in the Caribbean Basin: Costa Rica, Jamaica
and the Dominican Republic, Desarrollo productivo series,
No. 49 (LC/G.1991), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Noland, M. and H. Pack (2002): Industrial Policies and Growth:
Lessons from the International Experience, Documentos de
trabajo, No. 169, Santiago, Chile, Banco Central de Chile, July.
Peres, W. (coord.) (1997): Políticas de competitividad industrial
en América Latina y el Caribe en los años noventa, Mexico
City, Siglo XXI Editores.
Peres, W. and N. Reinhardt (2000): Latin America’s new economic
model: micro responses and economic restructuring, World
Development, vol. 28, No. 9, Amsterdam, Elsevier, September.
Peres, W. and G. Stumpo (2002): Las pequeñas y medianas empresas
industriales en América Latina y el Caribe, Mexico City, Siglo
XXI Editores.
Pérez Caltendey, E. (2003): Policies for Productive Development in
Caribbean Economies, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), August.
Porter, M. (1990): The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New
York, The Free Press.
Robinson, J. (1953): Imperfect competition revisited, The Economic
Journal, vol. 63, No. 251, Oxford, United Kingdom, Blackwell
Publishing.
Rodrik, D. (1995): Getting interventions right: how Korea and
Taiwan grew rich, Economic Policy, No. 20, Oxford, United
Kingdom, Blackwell Publishing, April.
Scarone, C. (2003): Las políticas sectoriales de Uruguay 1998-2002,
ECLAC/GTZ regional project “A natural resource-cluster
development strategy: its growth, distributive and
environmental implications”, Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Secretaría de Economía (2001): Programa de Desarrollo
Empresarial de México, 2001-2006, Mexico City.
(2003): Política económica para la competitividad,
Mexico City.
Sergeant, K., S. Racha and M. James (2003): The Petroleum Sector.
The Case of Trinidad and Tobago. Trends, Policies and Impact.
1985-2002, ECLAC/GTZ regional project “A natural resource-
cluster development strategy: its growth, distributive and
environmental implications”, Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Silva, I. and C. Sandoval (2003): Políticas de desarrollo productivo
en Chile, con especial referencia al nivel local y regional,
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Stallings, B. and W. Peres (2000): Crecimiento, empleo y equidad.
El impacto de las reformas económicas en América Latina y el
Caribe, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Stigler, G. (1951): The division of labour is limited by the extent of
the market, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 59, No. 3,
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Unger, K. (2003): Clusters industriales en México: especializaciones
regionales y la política industrial, ECLAC/GTZ regional project
“A natural resource-cluster development strategy: its growth,
distributive and environmental implications”, Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC).
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization)
(2003): Informe sobre el desarrollo industrial correspondiente
a 2002/2003: Competir mediante la innovación y el
aprendizaje, ID/414, Vienna. United Nations publication, Sales
No. S.02.II.B.13.
Velasco, M.P. (2003): Una evaluación de las políticas de
competitividad en Colombia, ECLAC/GTZ regional project “A
natural resource-cluster development strategy: its growth,
distributive and environmental implications”, Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC).
83C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 8  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 6
THE SLOW COMEBACK OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  •  WILSON PERES
Villagómez, A. (2003): Una revisión de la política sectorial en
México: 1995-2003, ECLAC/GTZ regional project “A natural
resource-cluster development strategy: its growth, distributive
and environmental implications”, Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Wade, R. (1990): Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the
Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton,
Princeton University Press.
World Bank (1993): The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth
and Public Policy, Washington, D.C.
Young, A. (1928): Increasing returns and economic progress,
Economic Journal, vol. 38, No. 4, Oxford, United Kingdom,
Blackwell Publishing.
